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THE SOLICITORS AND GENERAL LIFE ASSuRANCE SOCIETY VS. LAMB
A policy of life insurance is conditioned to be void in certain events, "except to
,.he extent of any interest acquired therein by assignment for valuable consideration." The insurer mortgages the policy, together 'withreal estate; afterwards
the policy is avoided under the condition. The society is compelled by thk
mortgagee to pay him the policy, and it then files a bill to take his place at
against the other property comprised in the mortgage:
Held, that such a claim cannot be sustained; the contract being, not one of
security or indemnity, but for payment of a given sum in certain events.

The circumstances of this case were as follows :
F. Lamb had effected two policies of insurance on his life with
the plaintiffs, dated the 7th September 1853, and the 29th December 1853, to the amount of 15001. ; and by- certain deeds of mortgage and further charge of the 23d September 1853, and the 28th
November 1854, comprising considerable freehold and copyhold
estates, he had- assigned as collateral security these policies to
Ridgway to secure sums amounting in the whole to 80.001.
He had also subsequently assigned the same policies to other
parties by way of indemnity for sums paid on his account, into
the particulars of which it is not necessary to enter.
The fourth condition of the policies was, "that if any person
who- had insured his own life should die by duelling or by his own
act, whether felonious or not, or by the hands of justice, the policy
should become void, except to the extent of any.interest acquired
therein by actual assignment by deed for valuable consideration,
or as security or indemnity, or by virtue of any legal or equitable
lien as security for money, upon satisfactory proof to the board of
directors of the existence and extent of such interest."
F. Lamb died by his own hand, in a fit of mental aberration, on
the 8th February 1861, leaving a will by which his widow, the
defendant, was appointed executrix; and at the expiration of the
three months fixed by the conditions of the policy of insurance,
Ridgway, the mortgagee, commenced an action against the plain-
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tiffs, of course in the name of the executrix, to recover the sums due
upon the policies. A correspondence ensued between the plaintiffs'
solicitors and the defendants, in which the former stated, that as
the mortgage securities included property to a large amount in
addition to the policies, the insurance society intended to have the
question of their rights decided by a court of equity; they were,
however, willing to pay the policy moneys to the mortgagees towards the discharge of the mortgages, giving them notice at the
same time not to part with the securities.
The defendant's solicitor, acting also for the mortgagee, in reply,
assented to receive the money, but declined to enter into any
agreement by which the equitable rights of the parties might be
altered ; they stated that they could therefore only advise the
mortgagee to hold his securities until his principal and interest
were paid.
The money due on the policies (15851. 19s. Td.) was ultimately
paid to the mortgagee with the concurrence of the executrix.
The ompany now filed their bill, praying a declaration that
they were entitled (subject to the charges) to a charge upon the
freehold and copyhold hereditaments comprised in the several
mortgage and indemnity deeds to the extent of the sum paid by
them to the mortgagee with interest at 4 per cent. ; or, ii the
alternative, that such sum and interest might be apportioned among
the freehold and copybold hereditaments and the policies, and that
the plaintiffs might be declared entitled to the difference (if any)
between the sum paid by them (15851. 19s. 7d.) and the amount
for which the policies, taken rateably as against freeholds and
copyholds, were a security.
Bolt, Q. C., and Surrage (for f. Stevens), for the plaintiffs, contended that it was contrary to the policy of the law, as well as to
the terms of the contract in this case, to allow the estate of an
insurer who had thus violated the condition of the policy to derive
any benefit from it. Here the mortgagee had two kinds of security; he chose to exhaust the one for the benefit of the other,
but the plaintiffs, who, but for the mortgage, would have been
under no liability on the policy, were entitled to take the place of
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the mortgagee in respect of the security which he had elected not
to pursue. This case was to be distinguished from Cook vs.
Black, I Hare 390, for there the policy was the only security.
They also referred to The Amicable Society vs. Bolland, 2 D. &
C.1.
Gqffard, Q. G., and 08borne Morgan, for the defendants, argued
that the court must look only at the terms of the contract ; the
plaintiffs undertook certain risks, one of which was that the
amount secured on the policy should under any circumstances be
paid to the extent to which it might have been made the subject
of assignment for valuable consideration. To entitle them to recover against the estate of the insurer must be the subject of
express stipulation. It was impossible to maintain that policies of
life insurance were in the nature of contracts of suretyship or
indemnity: Dalby vs. The India and London Life Assurance
Company, 18 Jur. 1025; Bolland vs. Disney, 3 Russ. 351.
In case of a sale out and out, or of a mortgage of the policy
solely, it was clear the plaintiffs could not have set up any claim
like the present. The plaintiffs must go so far as to say that in
case of a deficiency of the freeholds and copyholds, they would be
entitled to recover out of the insurer's general estate. It was a
rule that the policy was to be construed most strongly against
the insurance company: Dufaur vs. The ProfessionaZL_ife Assurance Company, 25 Beav. 599.
Bolt, in reply, maintained that by expression of, or by necessary implication from, the terms of the contract, this policy was
absolutely void quoad the insurer; the only question was, what
were the rights of the parties in the absence of assignment ?
said that tie question raised in this
suit was undoubtedly new, the only case that at all touched upon
it being that of Cook vs. Black. There were two points to be considered: first, what was the position of the parties in the first
instance; secondly, how was that position affected by the payment
of the money to the mortgagee. He considered no question could
arise upon the correspondence as containing any agreement which
VIC-CHANCELLOR WOOD
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should affect the rights of the parties in equity. First, then, the
terms of the policy were, that in the event which had happened it
should be void except to a certain extent, namely, the amount for
which it stood as security by the assignments. A period, therefore, must be fixed at which that amount should be ascertained.
This policy was understood to be payable at the expiration of
three months from proof of the death of the insured ; that was accordingly the period for ascertaining its value, which would then
be the extent of the interest of the assignee. Looking, in the
next place at the object of these contracts, he was of opinion that
they were not merely for the benefit of the insurer's estate after
his death, but, in the language of WIGRAM, Y. C., in Cook vs.

Black, to be used as an negotiable security; and the condition
relative to assignment was intended to give it more value as such.
In all these cases it was of importance to look at the words of the
condition, and those used in the present instance made the case
much stronger in favor of the defendant than the expressions in
the case referred to. There it was said that if the interest of
the parties claiming under an assignment were less than the sum insured, they should be - indemnified" to the extent'of such interest,
thus affording some ground for the contention that the policy was
in the nature of -a contract for indemnity, and gave rise, to an
inquiry as to what other securities were in the hands of the
mortgagee. That could not be maintained in the present case.
Now it was clear that, looking at the general object of. these
policies, and the terms of that before him' upon an assignment of
the entire interest by way of sale, the society could, in the event
that had happened in the present case, have no claim to recover
the amount which they would be bound to pay from the estate of
the insurer; so also in the case of a mortgage of the policy alone.
He had, therefore, only to consider whether there was anything
in the circumstance that other securities were included with the
policy, to entitle to place the society in a different position ; he
could not see that there was anything in this circumstance. The
only question to be asked was, what was the "extent of the
interest acquired as security ?" In the present case that was to
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the extent of the whole policy at the period when the claim became
payable. Secondly, the money having been actually paid by the
society, he thought the position was still less favorable. It might
be a question whether, before payment, they might have filed a
bill to redeem, or to charge the other securities. But when the
period at which the value of the policy was to be ascertained had
gone by, there could be no taking a proportion between the two
sorts of securities; the real estate might have increased or decreased in value, and the whole state of things have been altered.
This consideration disposed of the alternative part of the plaintiffs"
prayer. On the whole case the plaintiffs had failed, and this bill
must therefore be dismissed with costs.

Rolls Court.
ABADAM vs. ABADAM.
A testator directed an annuity to bepaid out of his personal estate "without any
deduction whatever :"-Held, that the income tax was payable by the annuitant.

The question in this case was, whether an annuity of 5001.
directed by a testator to be paid out of his personal estate, "without any deduction whatever, was payable free from income tax."
Selwyn, Q. C., for the trustees.-The language in the case of
Festing vs. Taylor, 3 B. & S. 235, reversing 3 B. & S. 217, which
would be relied upon on the other side, was much stronger; for
there the rent-charge was directed to be paid, free from all deductions and assessments, whether imposed upon the rent-charge or
on the owner of the rent-charge. Income tax was imposed upon
the person, and was not properly a "deduction."
Cole, Q. C., for the annuitant.-An annuity payable out of personal estate stood on a different footing from a rent-charge issuing
out of land; and. this distinction was drawn in the 5 & 6 Vict. c.
35, ss. 89 and 102 (Income Tax Act).. Fe8ting vs. Taylor was a
direct authority in favor of the annuitant.
Selwyn, in reply.

